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Abstract 
The recent financial crisis has shown that national frameworks have been insufficient to stem the 
cross-border effects of the failure of a systemically important financial institution. This paper refers to 
the challenges for governments, in the aftermath of the financial crisis starting in 2007/2008, to 
provide stability in financial markets and the role of financial institutions for national economies and 
on a global scale. It discusses the need for coordinated action to resolve SIFIs by evaluating the 
regional approaches in Europe and the US, as well as considering the recommendations of four 
international bodies on the insolvency of large and complex financial institutions: the Financial 
Stability Board, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, the International 
Monetary Fund and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The paper argues that key 
implications need to be recognized in order to make a global cross-border insolvency framework work 
effectively to coordinate around another Lehman-like event. It concludes that much has been discussed 
and initiated in the last six years, however, many issues are still unsolved. While single measures with 
a regional character are fit and comprehensible as a starting point, the pursued goal should be a 
mandatory and internationally consistent, homogenous cross-border insolvency framework since the 
interconnectedness of global financial institutions and their importance for financial stability will 
make it very difficult to prevent the next crisis and its disruptive impact.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Bank failures [...] are almost a certainty at some time in our future. What is less certain is their cost 
to and adverse implications for macroeconomics. Past failures have frequently been resolved only 
at a very high cost to society, but they need not be. As with many things, the cost could be reduced 
through planning ahead in good times and having a well-developed, credible, and widely 
publicized plan ready to [be] put into action by policymakers when the need arises. The plan 
should be widely publicized in advance, both banks and their consumers, as well as regulators, can 
take it into account in their planning and behavior and [so] it [will] not [be] a surprise that is likely 
to upset people who [might] then claim that they were treated unfairly.1 
 
Despite all the discussions on the consequences of the failure of a large, complex, international 
systemically financial institution (SIFI)2 – the need for orderly liquidation, for effective regulation and 
supervision,3 and the fact that a lot has been written on the topic,4 – not much substantive and coherent 
international groundwork was achieved before, or even after, the unexpected bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brother Inc. sent shockwaves into the financial markets.5 Whether the trigger for the financial crisis 
was the burst of the housing market bubble in the US, Lehman Brothers’ filing for bankruptcy in the 
early hours of September 15th 2008 or uncertainties in the market about government support for SIFIs 
“too big to fail” (TBTF) ,6 is a somewhat philosophical discussion as it will not change the result of 
those days: a massive disruption of the financial system, damage to the trust of market participants that 
led to liquidity drying up and market participants ceasing to directly lend to each other, credit spreads 
shooting through the sky and banks writing off debts to adjust to their market value. Governments 
around the world acted quickly to release pressure from their national financial institutions and to 
contain the damage.7  
It did come as a surprise to most market participants that Lehman Brothers was not rescued but 
was made to fail. Failures of banks, however, are not new.8 The word has it origins in the Italian 
medieval phase “banca rotta” (broken bench): when a banker was no longer able to exercise his craft, 
his creditors broke the banker’s table, signifying that the banker was insolvent. Even in modern times, 
financial institutions around the world have failed.9 In the US, though, the Livingston Doctrine10 had 
for centuries provided a gentlemen’s agreement that no bank would be left to fail when the economic 
                                                      
1 Evanoff and Kaufmann (2005), Preface, vii. 
2 Hüpkes and Devos (2010), mn. 17.05: “financial institutions, which may create systemic risk, a failure of one institution 
would cause in turn the failure of others because of reciprocal credit exposure.” 
3 Among others: Evanoff and Kaufmann (2005); De Rosa (2003); Caprio Jr. et al. (2006); Fratianni et al. (2002); Barth et al. 
(2001); Giovanoli and Heinrich (1999); Caprio Jr. et al. (1998);  
4 Among others: Miller and Cafaggi (2013); Brummer (2012); Carmassi and Micossi (2012); Macdonald et al. (2012); 
Buckley andArner (2011); Hoflich (2011); Mitchell and Wilmarth (2010); Kolb (2010); Fiordelisi et al. (2010); Busch 
(2009). 
5 Admati and Hellwig (2013), Preface, ixff.  
6 “Too big to fail” is an attribute referring to the likely consequences of a failure, and the liquidation of such an institution, 
being seriously contagious and leading to possible failures of other financial institutions, causing market disruptions 
resulting in damage to the overall economy by compromising the stability of the financial system as a whole. For the 
Domino effect, see Solidoro (2013), 187. 
7 Adrianova et al. (2012),214ff. 
8 Haentjens and Wessels (2014), 3ff. 
9 Santomero and Hoffmann (1998), 1. 
10 Livingston v. The Bank of New York, see Gorton (2012), 9, 106-107. 
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situation was in a state of public distress.11 The weekend before Lehman Brothers was doomed to fail, 
Bear Stearns was sold in a fire sale to JPMorgan, while Merrill Lynch was acquired by the Bank of 
America. A day after the Lehman Brothers collapse, the American Insurance Group (AIG) was 
rescued by the government. An additional failure would probably have caused not only more market 
disruptions but would have led to a failure of the financial system as a whole. Financial institutions are 
still attributed an important role in national economies and overall welfare on a global scale. This is 
one of the reasons why the government stepped in to bail out SIFIs. The outcome of the financial crisis 
was a great loss of confidence in the design of the global financial system and the efficient market 
hypothesis12. Intervention into markets is a distortion of competition. Market discipline with regard to 
the resolution mechanism is only effective when the framework is able to protect insured depositors, 
impose losses on the unsecured while ensuring the continuity of the essential banking services. 
This paper takes a brief look at the role of financial institutions for the real economy and national 
welfare, followed by the challenges experienced with TBTF and the need for an effective cross-border 
insolvency framework. It will outline the backgrounds and resolution approach made by the European 
Union and the United States as well as the international approaches to deal with these institutions in a 
possible distress situation in future. The paper disregards the regulatory race of qualitative and 
quantitative measures (capital liquidity, ratios, and financial transaction taxes) but does focus on the 
measures and possible legal norms to implement a global cross-border insolvency framework for 
financial institutions that allows for effective resolution. If we want to restore trust and confidence in 
the financial market and its actors, there is a need for legal certainty: the need to know that when such 
failures come to pass, we will know ahead of time how to deal with them. 
I. The Role of Financial Institutions for National and Global Welfare 
The notion of a financial institution in distress13 has a more contagious impact than a corporation in 
distress of comparable size because of its public function for an economy.14 The view is that banks are 
special when compared to other organizations.15 A financial institution – the larger the institution, the 
greater the likelihood – is more vulnerable to the loss of public confidence as the lack of trust and 
confidence in the viability of its business generally ends its operational and economic survivability.16 
The public trust in financial institutions is generated by their economic functions. These are, among 
others, the intermediary functions of maturity transformation, size transformation, currency 
transformation and – most importantly – the function to provide the real economy with the necessary 
liquidity (credit) to facilitate economic growth. 17 
                                                      
11 Gorton (2012), 122. 
12 Brealey and Myers (1984), 784. Efficient market hypothesis, which “merely implies that competition in capital markets is 
very tough – there are no money machines, and security prices reflect the true underlying value of assets […therefore] 
financial managers assume that capital markets are efficient unless they have a strong, specific reason to believe 
otherwise. This means trusting market prices and trusting investors to recognize true economic value.” See also 
Grossman and Sticklitz (1980), discussing the idea that if everyone blankly assumes that the market is efficient and will 
not take any action to exploit it, then it will become efficient. For more on efficient markets, see Fama (1970). 
13 Laeven and Valencia (2010). Financial distress is considered when there are significant signs, e.g.: bank runs; or, in 
response to losses, significant policy intervention measures are adopted. At least three of the following measures are used 
to determine the significance: extensive liquidity support (5% of deposits); payment of bank restructuring costs (at least 
3% of GDP); bank nationalizations, mainly including cases where the government takes a majority stake in the capital of 
systemically important financial institutions; creation of guarantees on bank liabilities indicating that either a full 
protection of liabilities has been issued or guarantees have been extended to non-deposit liabilities of banks; asset 
purchases (at least 5% of GDP); deposit freezes. 
14 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.08. 
15 Among others, Corrigan (1983), see also Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.07. 
16 Huertas (2011), 9. Santomero and Hoffmann (1998), 4, 5. 
17 Santomero and Hoffmann (1998), 2, 3. 
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We must note, however, that financial institutions have become more than only intermediaries; 
most institutions considered SIFI or TBTF as conglomerates with their main focus on investment 
banking.18 In order to maintain trust in the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, governments stepped in 
to rescue financial institutions that were TBTF; the government intervened in the market by bailing 
out financial institutions, making direct capital contributions, and providing loans from public funds or 
explicit state guarantees. Such state intervention came with a price tag. In a functioning and efficient 
market economy with self-regulating market power19, viable companies survive while unviable 
companies eventually fail and disappear. In the case of financial institutions, governments in many 
countries have provided an implicit guarantee for rescue measures in the event of financial distress. 
The downside of such rescue assurance has led to moral hazard20: setting the wrong incentives for 
financial institutions and encouraging negligence and unreasonable hazardous risk tolerance, which 
raises the risk of competitive distortions, has resulted in decreased confidence and legal uncertainty in 
the financial market sector until today.21  
II. The Challenges of Distressed Financial Institutions 
Regulation of the financial industry has occurred in waves on a national level as well through 
international initiatives (e.g. Basel Accords by the Bank of International Settlement). Regulatory 
action is the consequence of a crisis situation, whereas long and stable periods of regulation were 
followed by long periods of inattention and, after decades without major systemic risk or contagious 
events, subsequently, deregulation. This deregulation may lead to excessive risk taking, the growth of 
speculative bubbles, or waves of overconfidence and complacency, resulting again in financial 
regulatory action to close the gaps that initiated and contributed to the crisis. 
Though history has been repeating itself, the major challenge in the aftermath of 2008 was that 
there was no orderly liquidation or resolution procedure in place for large cross-border operating 
financial institutions – despite discussions on, and forecasts about, the consequences that may arise 
when a SIFI / TBTF financial institution becomes financially distressed and could eventually fail.22 
This challenge is even greater when financial institutions operate across borders, in different 
jurisdictions.23 The corporate structure of such an institution is designed to optimize the economic 
return to the group with a mix of regulated and unregulated entities.24 
                                                      
18 Claessen, Herring, Schoenmaker (2010), p. 58, Fn. 55: Bank of America (primarily a bank, but also an investment bank); 
Citigroup (a bank, investment bank and insurance company); Goldman Sachs & Co. (a bank holding company, migrating 
a portion of its derivatives portfolio to the bank, a broker-dealer (repo), and other corporations); J.P. Morgan Chase Bank 
(primarily a bank and investment hank); Morgan Stanley (a bank holding company migrating a portion of its derivatives 
portfolio to the bank, a broker-dealer (repo) and other corporations); Wells Fargo (a bank); also major custodians that 
operate as banks, including the Bank of New York Mellon, Northern Trust, PNC Financial Services Group, and State 
Street Corporation. 
19 See fn. 12. 
20 Santomero and Hoffmann (1998), 11. 
21 It seems that the news of scandals that various international financial institutions have engaged in is endless e.g. exchange 
rate or LIBOR fixings, gold standard irregularities, which have deepened to a lack of trust in the financial industry.  
22 Crocket, in: Evanoff and Kaufmann (2005), 17ff.  
23 Fletcher (1992), IX: “Cross-Border insolvency is the expression frequently employed to designate those causes of 
insolvency where the assets, or liabilities, of an insolvent debtor are located in two or more separate jurisdictions, or 
where the circumstances of the debtor are such as to render the company simultaneously subject to the insolvency laws of 
more than one country.” 
24 Lehman Brothers Inc. Group consisted of 2,985 legal entities, operating in 50 countries, see Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group, March 2010, p. 14, mn. 49. 
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III. The Need for an Effective Cross-Border Insolvency Framework 
“Bankruptcy is a backup”25 since “[t]he rule must still be that debts are meant to be repaid in 
full”26 
Even though insolvency is supposed to be a backup, having a procedure in place is necessary in the 
event of a default, in order to allow for an effective and fast way to resolve both corporate companies 
and financial institutions. However, general corporate insolvency law is unable to deal with insolvent 
financial institutions. While corporate insolvency law generally aims at the fair treatment and 
maximization of creditor recovery in slow, court-based proceedings with lengthy negotiations among 
stakeholders, resolution of financial institutions aims at minimizing disruption to the financial system 
and preserving the continuity of banking operations in order to avoid a systemic banking crisis. The 
crucial importance of this objective, that would ideally drive a special resolution regime, should limit 
the influence of private parties (e.g. creditors’ rights). This applies even more to cross-border 
insolvency cases, which are quite a daunting challenge. Although some countries have already 
established a national framework to resolve financial institutions, these do not adequately address the 
resolution of financial institutions TBTF.27  
The various legal procedures and substantive legal provisions are not only derived from their 
historical contexts, attitudes and values28 but are also rooted in social, economic, or political factors 
important to societal life.29 Different statutory objectives between different jurisdictions invariably 
relate to the fundamental rules and principles of a nation.30 However, law is not always capable of 
solving effectively all the challenges it is presented with, and since “Law is power. Law is politics”31, 
the political power and the influence of interest groups on the political will32 should not be 
underestimated in making law,33 especially for strong lobbying industries like financial institutions and 
insurance companies. The bail-out of many financial institutions during the crisis was an achievement 
of political will rather than economic logic. 
With no resolution plan in place when a complex financial institution approaches insolvency, 
political pressure will rise to influence any response of regulators to provide a solution to the 
challenge:  
Minimizing immediate short-run costs is likely to outweigh minimizing later longer-run and 
longer-lasting costs, even if these delayed costs promise to be substantially greater. Stated 
differently, today will win out over tomorrow and politics will trump economics.34  
The best case scenario would be that supervisory authorities and central banks could ensure the 
maintenance of a robust financial system by providing adequate capital cushions to absorb any market 
disruptions and thereby avoid spillovers that threaten financial stability. In the case of a probable 
default event of a cross-border financial institution, supervisory authorities should also provide for an 
                                                      
25 Easterbrook (1990), 416. 
26 Cárdenas, in Buljevich (2005),  xx 
27 The UK Banking Act, which was introduced to Parliament on 7th October 2008 (see also Claessens, Herring, Schoenmaker 
(2010), 113ff.) or the German Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten, introduced on 9. December 2010 BGBl. I 
S. 1900. 
28 Finch (2010), 521. 
29 Watson (1983), 1134ff. 
30 Fletcher (1992), Preface, X. 
31 Watson (1983),  1125. 
32 Wilks (2013), 11. 
33 Watson (1977), 9 whereas “various interests of groups and individuals” may be “very active in preserving [rules suiting 
them]”. See also Renner (2011), 111ff. that the legal system must maintain its structural couplings to the political system 
and thereby find ways for transnational legal structures to reflect domestic, supranational and international discourse 
alike. In addition Grant and Wilson (2014), Preface viii: legislation requires also great political and tactical skill. 
34 Evanoff and Kaufmann (2005), Preface, vii-viii. 
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immediate and effective response to the crisis – often within hours if disruptions are to be minimized. 
This is in contrast to most bankruptcy proceedings of corporations, where the opening of the 
proceedings leads to an automatic stay, protecting the status quo of the debtor and enabling the 
administrator to collect and realize the assets. In any case, the resolution plan asked for by regulators 
and supervisors to prepare for the case of bankruptcy of financial institution will provide the necessary 
information on, and clarity about, the corporate structure of a complex financial conglomerate, 
avoiding a last-minute attempt to formulate and execute a resolution plan35 whereby a substantial 
value of the bankruptcy estate could be rescued.36 Since many financial institutions have become much 
too complex to be taken through any kind of resolution procedure in a reasonable amount of time, it 
seems naive to expect these firms to willingly give up complexity, a complexity that assures them 
access to (government) subsidies providing them with a safety net and therefore a competitive 
advantage over other smaller, less complex institutions. It is important that the process of resolution 
planning produces demonstrable improvements in the resolvability of these institutions and reduces 
complexity. 
When the first line of defense protecting the integrity of the financial system fails, a cross-border 
insolvency proceeding provides the second line of defense, while the insolvency framework should 
recognize the waterfall of losses, beginning with shareholders and creditors who have been paid to 
take the risk, and protect taxpayers and other potential sources of bailout funds from loss. A good 
cross-border insolvency framework should deliver predictable ex post efficient results that maximize 
the value of the bankrupt business for the satisfaction of creditors and other stakeholders. However, 
during the recent financial crisis, national authorities either used public money to bail out banks, or 
ring-fenced the assets belonging to a bank within their territory.37 They applied national resolution 
measures at the single-entity level rather than considering the cross-border perspective of the financial 
conglomerate. 38 
An effective cross-border insolvency law to allow for the orderly resolution of a financial 
institution is important for both debtors and creditors. It should create legal certainty when dealing 
with financial institutions TBTF, thereby preventing public funds being spent to avoid a financial 
meltdown. As I have just said, the failure of financial institutions and their structural vulnerability in 
the financial system has long been on the policy agenda of governments and policymakers around the 
world, as they stand at the center of the international payment system, on a daily basis channeling 
transactions that represent large multiples of their capital. In the event of default, the transactions 
would be stopped, leading to no more payments, causing a huge erosion of liquidity in the system 
resulting in failed payments for a wide range of transactions. These would put the solvency of other 
parties and financial institutions at risk. The main challenge for resolution planning is therefore to 
create a system capable of allowing the failure of individual financial institutions while preserving 
global economic and financial stability.  
Despite the fact that maintaining a sound and efficient financial system able to effectively respond 
to a market disruption is a crucial prerequisite for a country’s economic and social welfare, a single 
uniform, formalized, operationally and legally robust international approach  has not yet been 
achieved as actions have been limited to within national borders. This leaves many questions open: 
Why has it not been agreed upon yet? Haven’t we talked about this issue since the beginning of the – 
almost – meltdown? What is it that governments and policymakers are not able to agree on a 
cooperative approach that would be beneficial for all parties involved? What are the reasons? Only 
politics? And this is despite the fact that governments, policymakers, and the managers of financial 
institutions know about the importance of creating more certainty to be prepared for the next crisis. Or 
                                                      
35 Claessens, Herring, Schoenmaker (2010), 58ff. See also Hüpkes (2009), 515: “policy-makers need to give more attention 
to how the complexity of an institution's legal structure affects the resolution process as this makes a rapid and orderly 
wind-down virtually impossible; merely the size of an institution is the wrong feature to consider.” 
36 Cairns (2009): the administrators of Lehman Brothers handling the bankruptcy estimated a loss of at least USD75 billion 
due to the lack of any preparation for bankruptcy. 
37 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.09, also on supervisory ring-fencing, 17.12ff. 
38 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.10. 
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do we believe that all measures agreed upon today will not hold in the future as every crisis is 
different? All these questions show that reaching mutual agreement on a basic cross-border resolution 
framework still represents a big challenge despite the efforts made by international institutions in 
previous years.39  
However, one should keep in mind that the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceeding has clearly 
shown that winding up large and complex international financial institutions is a messy business.40 
Despite the fact that the discussion evolved around financial institutions TBTF, larger complex 
institutions have become even bigger because of the ongoing consolidation in the financial industry: 
Bank of America has acquired Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan Chase has taken over Bear Stearns and 
Barclays Bank has acquired the investment banking arm of Lehman Brothers out of the bankruptcy 
estate. The argument, however, seems to be true only for the US. The banking industry in the 
Eurozone is decreasing.41 This is, however, not because of any (usually cross national) mergers, which 
have only happened sporadically in the past,42 but because of the decreasing balance sheets of 
European Banks.  
IV. Regional Approaches for Resolution 
1. The United States 
Financial regulation and supervision has been on the US agenda since 1933.  
The United States recognized a long time ago the need to regulate banks differently to corporates. 
In 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act43 distinguished commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance 
companies, as it was believed that commercial banks’ securities operations had caused the stock 
market crash in 1929, thanks to the insider trading of securities. The act was created in “response to an 
incentive failure and recognition of the realities of the opportunities for bad behavior when incentives 
are not aligned properly”44. It introduced the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which 
had to ensure that depositors have prompt access to insured deposits and that a systemic threat of a 
failure is contained. The FDIC has a broad range of powers to repudiate contracts and transfer 
positions to other banks, as well as options for dealing with a bank failure, including liquidation, 
arranging a purchase and assumption transaction with another institution, establishing a 
conservatorship, providing open bank assistance or creating a bridge bank.45 With the desire to 
deregulate the financial industry, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act46 effectively repealed the Glass-
                                                      
39 See Section V.  
40 Claessens, Herring, Schoenmaker (2011), 42ff. for case studies of cross-border bank failures. 
41 FAZ (06.11.2013), 18: “The number of financial institutions in the Eurozone has decreased from 2008 until 2012 by 9% to 
5914, this refers to a decrease in balance sheet of 12%. Germany and France remain the biggest national banking markets 
with Spain and Italy following.” 
42 Solidoro (2013), 191, mentions the takeover of Erste Bank in Austria and Hypobank in Germany by the Italian Unicredit, 
and the takeover of the UK Abbey National by the Spanish Santander. FAZ (06.11.2013): “National takeovers are rather 
rare, Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank in Germany one of the exception. In the course of the crisis, however, the 
markets in Greece and Spain consolidated by regional takeovers.” For the merger option, see also Santomero and 
Hoffmann (1998), 9ff. 
43 Banking Act of 1933, Pub.L. 73−66, 48 Stat. 162, H.R. 5661, 16  June 1933.   
44 Shiller, in Kroszner and Shiller (2011), p. 19.   
45 A bridge bank is a temporary national bank organized by the FDIC to take over and maintain banking services for the 
customers of a failed bank. It is designed to bridge the gap between the failure of the bank and the ultimate resolution, 
which is intended to happen as quickly as a suitable buyer can be found. 
46 The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act was created to enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a 
prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other financial service providers, and for other 
purposes, Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338, 12 November 1999. 
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Steagall Act in 1999 and allowed commercial banks to resume investment banking and to affiliate 
with insurance companies.47  
US Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act48 in 2010 
as the “most ambitious regulatory reform since the Great Depression”49. Among others,50 Dodd-Frank 
established the authority for the Financial Stability Oversight Council to require systematically 
important nonbank financial companies and large “interconnected” bank holding companies to 
establish resolution plans for failing bank holding companies or other financial institutions, as well as 
the authority for the relevant government agencies to undertake prompt and orderly resolution, outside 
the ordinary corporate bankruptcy procedure.  
This deregulation and the changing landscape of the interconnected business model may be one of 
the reasons why the FDIC was not able to deal with failing important US SIFIs despite having the 
powers and various instruments in place. One of the reasons was the court structure in the US. There is 
no mechanism in place that ensures effective coordination between courts that would have been 
necessary to deal with the failure of a SIFI. Corporation would also been accounted for with state 
insurance supervisors and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). Both seemed to be 
unwilling to transfer powers to the FDIC. Instead, they insisted, and still insist, on guarding the clients 
and customers they are required to protect.  
Advocates of the FDIC suggest expanding its powers to make it a resolution agency capable of 
dealing with SIFIs: they would like to create an agency that would be able to shape many aspects of 
the resolution process, including the timing of closures and the choice of reorganization, liquidation or 
a pre-packaged resolution.51 It should have power to wipe out shareholders (except for residual value) 
and to allocate losses (or protection from losses) across and within creditor classes with the flexibility 
to maintain an orderly resolution. All of this is largely in Dodd-Frank. In addition, the FDIC should 
also have the ability to maintain critical systemically important services, such as to select the 
management while the SIFI is in the resolution, reorganization or bridge institution phase, and to have 
the ability to claw back funds that had been inappropriately transferred before the failure (which could 
of course include funds transferred internationally) while avoiding any second guessing by the courts. 
The FDIC should also have a pool of funds – collected from the SIFIs, not taxpayers – to cover losses 
not allocated to depositors or other creditors deemed necessary to prevent systemic risk. Dodd-Frank 
does not provide for an ex ante resolution fund but it provides for bail-in and contingency planning. 
Being subject to Title II of Dodd-Frank, resolution is determined through a multistep process: 
whether the financial institution in question is a “covered financial company” 52 under the Dodd-Frank 
Act and whether its financial activity has been defined by the FDIC. There is only limited judicial 
review53 of the classification of the firm as a covered financial institution. 
                                                      
47 Higgott, in Grant and Wilson (2013), 17. 
48 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was enacted so as to promote the financial stability of 
the US by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes, Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173; herewithafter Dodd-Frank. 
49 Shiller, in Kroszner and Shiller, p. 2. 
50 E.g. creation of a Financial Stability Oversight Council and Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection; reallocation of 
banking oversight responsibility among the Federal Reserve System, the Controller of the Currency, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation;  changes requiring the Federal Reserve Board to supervise systemic nonbank financial 
companies; authority for regulators to impose enhanced size- and risk-based capital and liquidity standards those 
institutions deemed systematically important; and heightened capital requirements more generally. 
51 Claessens, Herring, Schoenmaker (2010), 80. 
52 Expressly excluded from the definition of a covered financial company are all depository institutions, government 
sponsored enterprises, and any government entities. 
53 Fitzpatrick and Thomson (2011) “Judicial review utilizes an “arbitrary and capricious” standard – typical when reviewing 
decisions of administrative agencies – which essentially prevents the judiciary from overruling those determinations 
unless there was no reasonable basis for them. Its powers under the orderly liquidation authority mirror those it already 
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Even though the Dodd-Frank Act attempts to provide for an orderly resolution procedure for 
financial institutions, it fails to provide a viable framework for resolving a complex cross-border 
financial conglomerate, taking into account a corporate structure which could also include a securities 
firm and/or an insurance company. In addition, advocates as well as critics have recognized the 
necessity of coordinated resolution activities with other foreign jurisdictions that may be affected by 
the FDIC’s intervention; however, this would be very different to the current FDIC in terms of the 
scope of its domestic and foreign powers. On the bright side though, Dodd-Frank focuses on 
derivative contracts, placed onto platforms with central counterparties, thereby improving the 
infrastructure for resolution. However, it leaves much implementation to be determined by the rule-
making regulators and supervisors. 
At the forefront of resolution planning, the Federal Reserve Bank and the FDIC have taken sharp 
measures to ensure that the living wills portray reality when they neglected the wills of eleven 
financial conglomerates as not sufficient enough and requested amendments.54  
2. The European Union 
While the European Union concentrated on creating the internal market and achieving the monetary 
union, the establishment of the banking union was neglected, leading thus to many regulatory actions 
in order to cope with the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Various Member States in the European Union bailed out their banks in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The European legal experience, with financial institutions operating in different jurisdictions, has been 
challenging: indeed, to reach any common legal standard continues to be a significant challenge. Only 
a few years ago, European institutions adopted the 2001/24 Directive 2001/24/EC on the 
reorganization and winding up of credit institutions55 after more than a decade of negotiations.56 The 
crucial objective of this body of conflict-of-law rules consists in ensuring that when a European trans-
national bank fails, all creditors and investors are involved in a unified procedure. By applying the 
universality principle, this approach adheres to the recent trends that came out of the European debate 
on the matter. Yet, there were various shortcomings in the directive: For instance, it did not take into 
account a group or conglomerate structure, especially when a bank as a stand-alone entity can induce 
the failure of solvent subsidiaries which otherwise could have been reorganized and remained solvent. 
In addition to that, official administrators may face special difficulties in implementing certain 
recovery operations, such as ‘purchase and assumption’ transactions.57  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)58 
was implemented as the institutional framework, in an attempt to regain and ensure financial stability 
in achieving the common internal market. The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)59, 
constituting the European Banking Authority (EBA)60, the European Insurance and Occupational 
(Contd.)                                                                    
has for depository institution receiverships, including the equivalent of bridge bank authority and the limited judicial 
review of its actions.”  
54 FAZ 19.08.2014, 18. Another difficulty is that the Federal Reserve Bank and the FDIC has different standards in 
evaluating the living wills. 
55 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the reorganization and winding up of credit 
institutions, OJ L 125/15, 05.05.2001, hereinafter Winding-Up Directive.  
56 Solidoro (2013), 193. 
57 Ibid., 187. 
58 Recital 5, Regulation 1095/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), OJ L 331, 15.12.2010. 
59 Recital 10, Regulation 1095/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), OJ L 331, 15.12.2010. 
60 Regulation 1093/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12. 
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Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 61 and a European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 62 for micro-
prudential supervision were given the authority to merge the different supervisory and regulatory 
approaches to financial institutions of the EU Member States. The European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) for macro-prudential supervision, under the responsibility of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), complements the framework.63 The aim is to achieve an integrated banking union, providing a 
consistent and coherent framework for financial services within the Eurozone with a "single rulebook 
in the form of capital requirements […] harmonised deposit protection schemes […] and a single 
European recovery and resolution framework.”64 Key elements of the integrated banking union are the 
single supervisory mechanism (SSM)65, while the ECB assumes responsibility for specific supervisory 
and regulatory tasks for SIFIs in the Eurozone,66 and for the single resolution mechanism (SRM), 
including a single resolution fund67. More than anything else the SSM will help to strengthen 
coordination, information sharing, and decision making in relation to cross-border banks.68 This 
should also break the vicious cycle between banks and sovereign governments69 that is widely viewed 
as having played a major role in bringing about the Eurocrisis.  
The single European recovery and resolution framework was implemented with the Directive 
2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms70. It establishes the requirements for all European Member States and members of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) national resolution frameworks, and aims to ensure that the 
financial institutions can be resolved in a timely manner, with minimal risk to financial stability and 
minimal losses borne by shareholders and creditors. There is no logical response to why such an 
important framework has been enacted by a directive and not by a regulation, which would be directly 
applicable in all Member States and could ensure more harmonization for the resolution of financial 
institutions.  
The Directive 2014/59/EU covers credit institutions established in EU Member States, parent 
companies, (mixed) financial holding companies, investment firms, and other financial institutions 
established in the EU and subject to consolidated banking supervision. It provides for resolution 
powers, including rules relating to the early intervention and restructuring power as well as tools for 
the sale of an institution’s business; transfer of assets and liabilities to a bridge institution; separation 
of assets for transfer to an asset management vehicle; and treatment of shareholder rights (bail-in), as 
well as creditors’ rights and obligations, avoidance powers, treatment of intra-group claims, rights to 
set-off and netting, and the treatment of financial contracts. In particular, the bail-in tool can be used to 
                                                      
61 Regulation 1094/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48. 
62 Regulation 1095/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84. 
63 Gurlit (2014) on a critical assessment of the division of power between the ECB and EBA and whether this will lead to 
competing supervisors. 
64 "Commission proposes new ECB powers for banking supervision as part of a banking union" (Press release). 
Communication department of the European Commission. 12 September 2012. Accessed 05 October 2013.  
65 Council Regulation 1024/2013/EU of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, OJ L 287/63, 29.10.2013. See Schuster (2014), 3, 4ff. 
for institutions covered by the SSM and the banking supervisory powers and tasks of the ECB. 
66 Schuster (2014), 3: “a milestone in the integration of the European banking markets”.  
67 For Eurozone Member States, national resolution funds will be pooled into the proposed EUR 55 billion single resolution 
fund to be operational by 2016. Contributions from banks are expected to be made over an eight-year period. 
68 Neumann (2014), 12ff. 
69 Draghi (2012). 
70 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and 
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, 
and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with 
EEA relevance, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190–348;  herewithafter BRRD.  
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recapitalize a failing institution, convert debt into equity, or reduce principal amounts on claims or 
debt instruments with the exception of specific ones, such as insured deposits and liabilities with a 
maturity of less than seven days.71 Other resolution powers allow resolution authorities to replace 
senior management, and to impose temporary stays on the payment of financial claims. It also requires 
financial institutions to prepare resolution plans. The resolution plans need to be approved by the 
ECB, which – after much debate on its responsibilities – has been given the power either to decide on 
the financial institution’s viability or to facilitate its resolvability. It remains unclear however what 
will happen to subsidiaries outside the reach of the BRRD as there are no legal rules or 
recommendation covering that issue. 
In the absence of agreement between an EU Member State and a non-EU resolution authority, e.g. 
Dodd-Frank Act in the US, decisions regarding the recognition of the non-EU authority’s resolution 
proceedings may be taken by each national resolution authority.72  
V. International Approaches for Resolution 
It is neither possible nor desirable for each individual government to independently work out all the 
legal details for the resolution of financial institutions. In order for a global framework to be 
effectively implemented, multilateral economic organizations are a key element in the process73 and 
have been given the task to initiate an effective cross-border framework for the resolution of financial 
institutions to secure financial stability. 
Most are set up as voluntary groupings rather than treaty-based institutions, and even those that do 
have a treaty basis (the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank) 
have no enforceable financial regulatory mandate. The willingness of individual jurisdictions to 
respect the choices made by these global bodies is therefore essential. What follows is a discussion of 
the attempts of several international bodies to work out how to address the problem of the cross-border 
insolvency regime. 
1. Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
In 2009, the G2074 gave the Financial Stability Board75 the task of finding a solution to cross-border 
insolvency of SIFIs within a year. This was rather optimistic considering the size, complexity and 
systemic interconnectedness of SIFIs.  
                                                      
71 The BRRD introduces tiered depositor preference. The waterfall of creditor claims established is as follows: (i) covered 
deposits, and the deposit insurance scheme by virtue of subrogation to the rights of covered depositors; (ii) eligible 
deposits of natural persons and micro- and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) exceeding the deposit insurance 
coverage level; (iii) deposits in foreign branches of EU banks; (iv) claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors; 
and (iv) shareholders.  
72 This provides more flexibility to EU authorities than under the Winding-Up Directive under which EU home authorities 
have exclusive competence in reorganization or winding-up measures relating to EU banks and their EU branches, with 
full recognition and legal effectiveness of such actions within the EU.  
73 Higott, in Grant and Wilson (2013), 16. 
74 The G20 was formed in 1999 and consists of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Until November 2008, G20 meetings were held at the level of finance ministers 
and central bank governors and not heads of state and/or government. 
75 The FSB includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Central Bank and a number of global 
institutions and bodies. In 2009, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Spain and Turkey as well as the European Commission were added. It also acts as a coordinator of 
the G20-related policy development processes of other global financial bodies, including the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS), the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
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The FSB has extensively analyzed the challenges and, in 2011, the G20 leaders and the FSB drew 
up the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes76. These enable authorities to exercise a broad 
range of powers without the need to obtain the consent of shareholders or creditors, subject to 
appropriate safeguards,77 among which are taking control of a failing financial institution, merging 
ailing banks with stronger institutions, and transferring assets and liabilities to a healthy institution 
(bridge bank). However, these key attributes are only recommendations and therefore non-binding 
standards. The peer review of national resolution schemes78 provides recommendations for future 
work by the FSB and its members, especially with regard to the effectiveness of national regimes for 
foreign resolution.79  
Another aspect the G20 focuses on was the attempt to force the harmonization of accounting 
standards to “achieve a single set of high-quality, global accounting standards.”80 In this regard, the 
G20 agenda has unambiguously failed as convergence projects have been conspicuously ignored by 
the independent accounting standard setters as the political will did not draw much pressure on these 
institutions. 81 
2. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
UNCITRAL has also been discussing the issue, raising questions of whether the adoption of a model 
law for the resolution of financial institutions – an equivalent to the cross-border model law for 
companies – would be an appropriate measure. However, one should keep in mind that despite there 
being a model law for the insolvency of companies only 20 nations have so far adopted this law. 
Discussions on recommendations are still on-going, however, another model law for financial 
institutions with far-reaching powers is not likely to be adopted by most nations. 
3. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
The International Monetary Fund published its “Resolution of Cross-Border Banks – A Proposed 
Framework for Enhanced Coordination”82 in 2010. The main objective of the framework is the focus 
of coordinating and aligning resolution efforts with the main goal of achieving consistency with the 
interests of creditors and domestic financial stability, and while the need for public funding should be 
minimized, it may be provided on a temporary basis to support procedures for recovery/resolution of 
financial institutions. The report also delivers the factors for the globalization of financial services and 
recognizes increased cross-border effects while national frameworks address the financial distress and 
failure only for national territory.  
(Contd.)                                                                    
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank.  
76 See FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf?page_moved=1, accessed 15 May 2014. 
77 In particular, an ideal resolution regime should include: (i) stabilization options that achieve continuity of systemically 
important functions through sales or transfers of the shares in the firm or of all or parts of the firm’s business to a third 
party, either directly or through a bridge institution; and (ii) liquidation options that provide for the closure and wind-
down of all or parts of the firm’s business (in a manner that protects insured depositors, insurance policy holders and 
other retail customers). 
78 See FSB, Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes, 11 April 2013. 
79 Only eight jurisdictions have statutory provisions that explicitly empower or strongly encourage resolution authorities to 
cooperate with each other: Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, UK, and US. See 
Financial Stability Board, Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes, Peer Review Report, 11 April 2013.  
80 G20 announcement in 2008, see Accounting Standards Advisory Forum: Memorandum of Understanding, 8 April 2013 for 
action on global accounting standards in, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Advisory-bodies/Documents/20130408-
MoU-Signed.pdf, accessed 18 May 2014. 
81 Higgott, in Grant and Wilson (2013), 21ff. on the failure of the FSB to gain some degree of global authority. 
82 IMF, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/061110.pdf, accessed on 15.05.2014. 
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4. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
The Cross Border Bank Resolution Group (CBRG) of the BCBS83 developed a set of 
recommendations84 that resulted from its follow-up work on the identification of the lessons learned 
from the global financial crisis which began in 2007. In particular, some of the events during the crisis 
revealed gaps in intervention techniques and the absence in many countries of an appropriate set of 
resolution tools, such as wider powers to national authorities to deal with financial institutions at a 
preventive stage, the authority to create bridge banks, to transfer assets and liabilities to other solvent 
institutions, and to hold managers accountable. The report advocates the harmonization of current 
insolvency regimes not by supranational (binding or non-binding) agreements, but by granting 
regulators substantially similar regulatory powers.  
During the resolution process, each country should have a mechanism to fund the ongoing 
operations of a cross-border financial institution. The funding mechanism might take the form of a 
deposit insurance fund or a public funding mechanism that would be reimbursed by an industry 
assessment. The BCBS Report did not provide any indication on how the costs of funding should be 
allocated or coordinated among the relevant national authorities. The BCBS Report, however, did note 
that effective crisis management and resolution of cross-border financial institutions required a clear 
understanding by the different national authorities of their respective responsibilities for supervision, 
liquidity provision, crisis management, and resolution of cross-border firms.  
Another important role for effective supervision of international banking groups was allocated to 
supervisory colleges, since they can enhance information-sharing among supervisors, help the 
development of a shared agenda for addressing risks and vulnerabilities and provide a platform for 
communicating key supervisory messages among college members.85 In June 2014, the BCBC issued 
its final Principles for effective supervisory colleges86 with great emphasis on: ongoing collaboration 
and information-sharing; the balance between core college effectiveness and host involvement; the 
ideas that home and host supervisors should put in place appropriate mechanisms and sufficient 
resources for effective and timely information exchange, should agree on what types of feedback they 
provide to banks and how they differentiate between banks that are systemically important banks or 
not, and how they provide guidance on communication and coordination.87 
VI. Resolution: Supranationalism or Convergence 
The objective of resolution includes collective procedures that allow a debtor, who is unable to pay 
creditors, to resolve debt through the reorganization or the allocation of the debtor assets among all 
creditors in an equitable manner.88 A bank failure resolution strives to balance among numerous public 
                                                      
83 BCBS is a committee of banking supervisory authorities that was established by the Central Bank governors of G10 in 
1974, providing a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance 
understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. The Committee also 
frames guidelines and standards in different areas - some of the better known among them are the international standards 
on capital adequacy, called the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Concordat on cross-border 
banking supervision. The Committee's members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The Committee's Secretariat is located at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland. 
84 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group, March 2010, available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf, accessed 16 June 2014. 
85 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Good practice principles on supervisory colleges, 12 October 2010, 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs177.htm, accessed 16 June 2014. 
86 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for effective supervisory colleges, 26 June 2014, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs287.pdf, accessed 30 June 2014. The guidelines replace the Good practice principles on 
supervisory colleges, as there was a commitment to revise them after a period of practical implementation experience. 
87 Ibid., 2-3.  
88 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.04. 
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and private objectives, including: maintaining strong incentives to meet contractual obligations, 
treating different similarly situated claims equitably (pari passu), preventing inter-creditor competition 
from reducing the value of the defunct firm, maintaining the positive externalities associated with the 
operation of the insolvent financial institutions, preventing adverse social consequences and costs 
resulting from financial failure.89  
Resolution planning is the key to an effective cross-border insolvency framework as it provides 
ready-to-hand plans for orderly resolution in the event of illiquidity or insolvency. It also serves as 
some kind of a preventive measure as the annual review process ensures financial institutions keep up 
with their own structural development, including: ascertaining the location of a bank’s assets; the 
operations of set-off and netting; the differential nature of deposit protection schemes for various 
national and international entities; and the fact that supervisory ring-fencing and different national 
insolvency rules can affect returns to creditors.  
 
There are two ways in which a cross-border insolvency framework can be set up: either by 
drawing supranational legal rules for an integrated and coherent framework or by convergence of 
national resolution procedures. 
1. Supranational Legal Framework 
A far-reaching approach that aims to converge legal norms with commercial reality would be a 
supranational framework, designing the framework as a binding legal instrument or as an international 
treaty ratified by all relevant home and host countries. This framework would designate the competent 
national resolution authorities for the resolution proceedings of all competent parts of the bank or, 
alternatively, establish a supranational authority in charge of resolution.90 As the structure of large 
cross-border banks is typically a financial group or holding with numerous bank and non-bank 
financial subsidiaries, which often operate in an integrated manner, this framework would also need to 
provide for a mechanism to resolve the bank’s subsidiary in a coordinated and integrated manner.91  
While a crisis generally gives the incentive for cooperation, when it comes to the benefit of 
domestic stakeholders of a global group (territorial approach or ring fencing), national authorities are 
reluctant to commit to cooperative solutions when national creditors would be worse off than in the 
resolution of a foreign bank’s domestic operations under foreign law than had the domestic regulation 
simply been wound up under the applicable national laws.  This contrasts the universal approach that 
recognizes the wholeness/unity of a legal entity across borders and provides for a process of mutual 
recognition of measures across borders. The treatment of a bank, with its foreign branches, needs to be 
distinguished from the situation when a bank operates through separate legal entity (subsidiaries) in 
foreign jurisdictions. Universality for instance is still fiercely challenged by the rest of the world in 
view of the surrender of sovereignty it implies from a host country’s perspective, as well as the risk of 
seeing the various priorities and liens given by the main jurisdiction being expanded and diluting the 
claims of creditors of foreign branches.  
Unlike branches or representative offices, subsidiaries are indeed separately incorporated legal 
entities under the corporate law of the respective jurisdiction. Subsidiaries may be subject to 
consolidated supervision by the home authority of the cross-border financial institution. However, the 
authorities of the chartering jurisdiction remain subject to first-line responsibility and resolution of the 
subsidiary. It is especially in an insolvency context that the situation of branches should be 
distinguished from subsidiaries. Each subsidiary has to be resolved separately; by contrast, foreign 
branches may in some jurisdictions be resolved by a single process under the insolvency regime of the 
main office’s jurisdiction.  
                                                      
89 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.04. Santomero and Hoffmann (1998), 7. 
90 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.35. 
91 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.35. 
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This solution would ensure the equitable treatment of all creditors, depositors, counter-parties and 
shareholders of group entities, regardless of the jurisdiction under which they are located. This would, 
in particular, require the careful assessment of intra-group asset transfers.92 The implementation of 
such a framework would obviously require major changes to national bank resolution frameworks, 
including the areas of commercial and property law. It would also raise important conceptual problems 
related to corporate separateness and the treatment of group interest. Having a common framework for 
resolution in place may not be enough. It might be necessary to address the many practical problems 
that arise in a complex cross-border resolution because of the inherent complexity of groups, the 
difficulty of obtaining information because of badly maintained record-keeping and risk-management 
systems, the necessity of identifying assets, liabilities, and counterparties on a legal entity basis, and 
sorting out inter-company transactions. 
In order to implement a supranational framework, it needs a clear and coherent understanding on 
how the losses would be allocated in a crisis and how the public burden would be shared for the case 
of resolving a cross-border financial institution. Countries will be unwilling to surrender powers to 
another authority or supranational body if they risk being left with a disproportionate share of the 
burden. It is rather unlikely that such an agreement will be achieved on a global scale in the near or 
medium future.  
2. Convergence and Coordination 
As national legislators have adopted national resolution regimes in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
an approach that favors convergence of national or regional resolution frameworks may be more 
effective in making progress for a broader cross-border insolvency framework for financial 
institutions, especially since the regulatory and supervisory processes already exist at a regional level 
in the US and European Union.  Such an approach would place greater reliance on existing but 
enhanced national resolution frameworks and would seek to achieve progress mainly by focusing on 
challenges of a high degree of legal uncertainty and unpredictability arising from the fragmented 
landscape of different resolution frameworks, and the inconsistencies across countries relating to 
intervention and a restructuring mechanism that complicate cross-border coordination.93 
Resolution planning as a mandatory part of the supervisory process should be challenged by  the 
supervisory authority when evaluating the living wills of financial institutions, imposing predictability 
and legal certainty in case of a distress situation and eventual failure.94 If done consistently, planning a 
resolution will have a significant impact on the way national authorities regulate and supervise cross-
border banks in the future. In order to reach that goal, certain measures have to be taken. 
a) Information sharing 
Sharing information on resolution plans with a common supervisory authority on a supranational level 
as implemented by the ECB can provide for a steep learning curve for national supervisors. It may 
cross-fertilize resolution measures and lead to the convergence of frameworks. In addition, it may also 
affect the way institutions operate and organize themselves. While it will never be possible to 
anticipate all the eventualities of financial or market distress, resolution planning gives national 
authorities and financial institutions a clear understanding of how the many different corporate entities 
would be handled in a crisis and how different national resolution regimes would interact, enabling 
them to identify actions that could be taken ex ante to facilitate resolution and reduce their systematic 
impact. Such a process would also ensure that national authorities as well as financial institutions 
acquaint themselves with the insolvency measures of other countries and be prepared for the worst 
case scenario.  Sooner or later, such an approach would lead to a better understanding of the impact 
                                                      
92 See Allen et al (2011), p. 41 questioning the soundness of the existing regulations, advocating for more detailed disclosure 
of all the transactions between the parent bank and its subsidiaries. 
93 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.39. 
94 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.40. 
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and interactions of universality – or territoriality-based systems95– prompting authorities to review the 
rationale of their own approaches and possibly consider legal changes that would lead to the 
convergence of national resolution regimes.  
b) Understanding Structural Complexity  
A better understanding of legal measures in different jurisdictions would also force managers to think 
much more carefully about the complex financial structures created within their organizations and the 
extent to which contractual obligations place substantial constraints on the choices that the authorities 
have to face in the event that reorganization measures need to be undertaken. If done properly, 
resolution planning should help to reduce the moral hazard associated with large cross-border financial 
institutions and should convince banks and market participants that a failing institution can be wound 
down in an orderly manner even though the wind-down may not necessarily be neutral for all 
stakeholders. 96 
c) Location of the Centre of Main Interest (COMI)  
Determining the COMI of the financial conglomerate in the process of resolution planning will enable 
a coherent chain of command in case of financial distress. One has to keep in mind though that those 
financial holdings may be set up in offshore countries to avoid transparency. The national authorities 
have to ensure judicial and legal transparency in the resolution planning.  
d) Protocols for Resolution Planning 
In order to foster the coordination and cooperation of national authorities, the resolution planning 
should include court-based protocols for cross-border insolvencies. There have been examples of 
court-based cooperation in complex corporate cross-border cases97 that could serve as a blueprint for 
financial institutions. 
 
It is hardly realistic to achieve a harmonization of all national bank resolution frameworks, however, 
efforts should be made to reach convergence in a few critical areas which could greatly enhance the 
prospects of achieving a coordinated, coherent and timely solution across borders. First, an early 
intervention could preserve value that minimizes losses and market disruptions and ensures continuity 
of essential business operations if, in all jurisdictions, the competition authority had the power to 
intervene early before an insolvency threshold is met. Second, national resolution regimes should 
provide for special resolution power for national or regional authorities (like the European SRM), 
while certain restructuring and resolution tools should facilitate the creation of temporary bridge bank 
structures and/or transfer assets and liabilities to another entity, supporting a coordinated solution. 
Third, the national authority’s legal capacity to cooperate across borders – such as broad information-
sharing, the possibility to recognize proceedings – facilitates the transfer of assets across borders, and 
assists a restructuring or resolution. Fourth, the ranking of (certain classes of) debt in insolvency: A 
common understanding of the ranking of certain creditor positions, such as, for example, the treatment 
of depositors, could help to achieve greater predictability and more consistent resolution across 
borders.98 
                                                      
95 IMF, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks – A Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination IMF, p. 10. 
96 IMF, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks – A Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination IMF, p. 12. 
97 Halliday and Carruthers (2009), 47ff. Maxwell’s group court-based protocol from 1991 stated its objective as harmonizing 
the proceedings of the UK and US court involved in order to facilitate a rehabilitation and reorganisation of Maxwell 
Corp. It was followed by the IBA Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat in 1995 and was founded on ten principles, see 
International Bar Association, available http://www.ibanet.org/About_the_IBA/IBA_instruments.aspx, accessed 
10.06.2014. 
98 Hüpkes and Devos (2011), 17.41. 
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Conclusion 
A well-designed legal framework is important for the functioning of financial markets and this is 
particularly true in times of global financial trouble. Although much noise has been made in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, not much action has taken place. The issue of international standards 
addressing cross-border bank insolvency is very much at a point of work in progress. There is no such 
framework yet with regard to cross-border financial institutions, neither at the European level nor at 
the international level. As a consequence, the interests of domestic and foreign authorities might not 
be fully aligned. 
National authorities are usually only concerned about a particular subsidiary under their 
jurisdiction. Whenever the losses generated by the failure of a foreign subsidiary are considered to be 
small, they decide in favor of a liquidation procedure that benefits local creditors. These decisions tend 
to avoid lengthy restructuring processes being undertaken in another country. Achieving a good level 
of co-ordination requires a sound legal and regulatory framework at the national level. However, this 
is not easy to attain. Common rules on appropriate intervention tools, creditor safeguards, robust rules 
on deposit priority and non-discrimination against foreign creditors are all factors that need to be 
brought into play to ensure a good result. Overall, until supervisory measures aimed at identifying 
problem banks at an early stage are well-implemented, the resolution process will continue to be the 
ultimate response to bank failures in order to break out of the current economic cycle.  
Resolutions relating to inter-jurisdiction conflicts still rely on the willingness of national 
authorities to co-operate with each other, as national efforts will fizzle out in the end and will lead to 
competitive disadvantages. It would be desirable that a single authority take the lead in coordinating 
responses – an authority with powers to implement a coherent and effective framework, not one based 
on the smallest common denominator. Closing unviable banks and recapitalizing and restructuring 
viable ones is inherently painful and politically charged. Structures to manage failed banks and assets 
remain inadequate in the most relevant economies such as the EU and the US.  
To respond to the challenges arising from global complex financial institutions means the creation 
of an overarching global framework that would include a harmonized set of both procedural and 
substantive rules, however, the complexity of implementing such a proposal is enormous. The 
resolution planning process could be an appropriate measure to increase transparency among different 
national authorities and enhance the transparency in complex institutions by better understanding how 
national resolution frameworks operate to prepare for the contingency of a financial failure. 
Determining where the COMI is located and preparing a court-based protocol for the respective 
jurisdictions that would be affected in the case of a failure could be a valuable step forward in dealing 
with the struggle of financial institutions in the future. 
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